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Introduction
Because of the abundant presence of common and rare natural re-
sources, South America is considered highly strategic for the new stage of 
capitalist accumulation and for the reproduction of its mode of production, 
inserting itself in a new competitive pressure worldwide that tends to accentu-
ate even more as the global demand for the resource increases. In geopolitical 
terms, it seems that the region has been incorporated in the world´s compet-
itive pressure in which some regions “must become international ‘zones of 
fracture’, in which conflicts and rebellions involving the great powers and 
companies that compete for the regions control could rise” (Fiori 2014, 161).
This article aims to evaluate the lithium geopolitics in the 21st century 
considering the national, regional and global geopolitical disputes that put 
South America at the center of the debate and create possible new tensions in 
the Andean region of the subcontinent. Our hypothesis is that lithium is one 
of the most strategic natural resources, whose world reserves, quantitatively 
and qualitatively, are concentrated in the South American region, based on a 
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bibliographical and qualitative review of statistical data on the subject present 
in studies and government documents. It is extremely important to carry out 
an analysis that covers the study of its behavior regarding reserves, produc-
tion, prices, supply, demand and a geographical analysis.
Lithium Characteristics
Lithium is an alkali metal, the smallest and lightest atom among all 
metals in the periodic table, under normal conditions of temperature and 
pressure. Because of its low atomic mass, it has a high charge and a specific 
power. It is not found in its native state. That is, it does not exist free in nature, 
being located most often in the condition of an ionic chemical compound. In 
addition, due to its high specific heat it is used in heat transfer applications 
and, because of its high electrochemical potential and high energy density, it 
is used as an anode suitable for electric batteries. For example, a typical lith-
ium-ion battery can generate approximately 3 volts per cell, compared to 2.1 
volts for the lead acid battery or 1.5 volts of zinc-carbon cells.
As for its applications, it is used in the manufacture of heat conduct-
ing metal alloys (aluminum), in the form of ceramics and lenses (telescopes), 
lubricating greases, military applications (rocket propellants and hydrogen 
bombs), in medicine (drugs for depression and bipolar disorder), in the elec-
trical and electronic industry (production of batteries and electric batteries, 
such as cell phones, notebooks and hybrid/electric cars), among others.
The demand for lithium has remained largely unchanged since its 
discovery in 1817 by the Swedish chemist Johan August Arfwedson. Over the 
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years, its properties were adjusted to the needs of technological development 
in several sectors, but its qualities as an energy transmitter were emphasized 
mainly in the 1970s, “considering a technological paradigm linked to com-
puting and electronics, in which a series of appliances and instruments are, 
increasingly powered by lithium batteries” (Palacio 2012, 6), such as the case 
of batteries of electronic devices and hybrid electric cars. From the 1990s 
onwards, this situation has changed mostly due to the proliferation of cell 
phones and portable computers.
Since the beginning of the 21st century, with the emergence of high 
demand for lithium ion batteries, the new companies have expanded lithium 
extraction to serve industries in this sector. Because of this, since 2007, the 
lithium market has as its largest consumer lithium ion battery industries, 
with even greater future projections.
Sourec: Cormarck Securities Inc. 2011; Baylis 2012.
Therefore, the strategic importance of lithium - a consequence of tech-
nological innovation and its applicability in the rechargeable battery industry 
of almost all portable electronic devices consumed in the world - is latent. 
However, perhaps its most important application, from the technological and 
environmental point of view, is the production of a new rechargeable battery 
technology for electric and hybrid vehicles: the EV (Electric Vehicle), which 
is powered only by electricity and charged in a electric plug-in, and also the 
Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (PHEV).
The advantage of the new lithium-ion battery technology is its high 
energy density, which allows it to store more energy per unit of weight, re-
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ducing considerably the total weight of these batteries compared to those pro-
duced from NiCd (nickel–cadmium battery) or NiMH (Nickel-metal hydride 
battery). In 1992, when lithium batteries were introduced, they had only 10% 
more energy than NiMH batteries. In 2005, the average energy density of 
lithium batteries was 80% higher than that of NiMH batteries. In 2009, as 
part of its energy program, the US government awarded 24,000,000 hours 
to IBM at two national laboratories, Argonne and Oak Ridge, for research to 
increase battery functionality for electric cars (Palacio 2012, 6).
The increase in the energy density of the lithium batteries has allowed 
the constant reduction of the total weight of these and consequently the de-
crease of the weight of the portable devices that use them. In the case of 
hybrid electric vehicles, the high energy density of lithium batteries is crucial 
(Viana, Barros and Calixtre 2011, 239).
Even with the technological developments in the scientific field of lith-
ium, some scholars still consider the large and heavy batteries, besides their 
reactivity being another source of problems. Still, scientists are opening new 
ways, working on a “lithium-air” battery3. In them, instead of being sealed in 
a casing, the lithium remains in contact with the air, and uses the ambient ox-
ygen as a cathode, as do the zinc batteries of hearing aids, making the battery 
much lighter. There are also scientists who have been using nanotechnology 
to densify the surface of the cathode, which can multiply the number of reac-
tions and increase, at least in theory, the power of the battery.
The use of lithium in these industrial branches is very recent. How-
ever, its increasing consumption in several strategic sectors has increased its 
consumption worldwide over the last 30 years. Thus, its regional/global map-
ping and its geopolitical disputes are fundamental to understand its growing 
importance in the international scenario over the years, and especially nowa-
days with its use for scientific and technological purposes.
In this context, it is highlighted how the presence of lithium in South 
America has aroused national, regional and global geopolitical disputes, plac-
ing the region at the center of the debate and creating possible new tensions 
in the Andean region of the subcontinent.
3 “A new technology, the lithium-air battery, may be capable of substantially increasing the 
energy density of lithium batteries, effectively rivaling the energy density of petroleum. Al-
though development of lithium-air battery technology is still in its infancy, a coalition of U.S. 
national laboratories and commercial partners led by International Business Machines Corp. 
anticipated having a laboratory prototype battery ready by 2013, a scaled-up prototype capable of 
powering a car ready by 2015, and commercial batteries in production within a decade” (United 
States 2012).
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The Lithium Geopolitics
The external environment that each state encounters in drawing its 
own strategy - an environment involving the presence of other states also 
struggling for survival and advantages -, aligned with periods of global up-
heaval and constant technological innovations, leads to a rebirth in the ideas 
regarding geography (Kaplan 2013, 62). This is the case of lithium, whose 
technological cycle begins between 2000 and 2005 and has a forecast of in-
tensive use until the period 2035-2045, according to estimates by Bruckmann 
(2011, 217-219).
For a case study analysis of lithium geopolitics in South America, it 
is very important to carry out an analysis that covers the study of its behavior 
regarding reserves, production, prices, supply, demand and a geographical 
area analysis.
Lithium reserves can be found from two distinct types of lithium 
salt concentrations: in hard rock mines, mainly in Australia, which produce 
lithium mineral concentrates for technical purposes and for conversion into 
lithium chemicals, almost exclusively in China; and in continental brines, 
for example the salares in Argentina, Chile, China and Afghanistan, most 
commonly used for the production of lithium carbonate, hydroxide and chlo-
ride. Generally, these regions are considered to be of lower operating cost and 
therefore more commercially viable compared to lithium minerals - although 
both are located in remote locations and present very different technical and 
logistical challenges.
The main reserves are found in salt regions, lands that for tens of 
thousands of years were covered by oceans and, with the geological formation 
of the continents, ended up drying and forming great salt deserts. The lithi-
um is dissolved below the coarse crust in a layer of salt impregnated solution. 
The fact that it is a mineral that is concentrated in the region of salares causes 
countries like Bolivia, Salar de Uyuni, Chile, Salar de Atacama, and Argenti-
na, with Salar del Hombre Muerto, to be among the world’s largest holders 
reserves of this resource, forming the so-called “lithium triangle”, presenting 
approximately 92% of world reserves in 2009 (Bruckmann 2011, 219).
The accounting of the world’s reserves of lithium varies according to 
the agencies and companies that realize it, as shown by several reports and 
the table below. However, its great geographical concentration in the Andean 
region of South America is an undeniable fact.
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Estimated lithium mineral resources (in million tonnes)
(1) Reference value, trhe methodology and parameters used are unkonwn.
(2) It was considered the resources that were measured and indicated as published by 
mining companies.
(3) According to Según USGS (2013) US resources mount to 5,5 Mt. Notwithstanding, the 
deposits that were considered and the parameters used on this calculation are uknown. 
(4) Estimated resource published in Roskill (2013).
Source: Cochilco 2013.
Lithium reserves by country
Source: Fox-Davies 2013.
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Although the methodologies and accounting parameters are used dif-
ferently, since there are distinctions of the models according to the companies 
or agencies that carry out the surveys, the fact is that Bolivia, Chile and Ar-
gentina own large percentage of the world’s reserves of lithium in the Year of 
2013. The image below ratifies this argument, in which South America would 
have approximately 71% of the lithium reserves, with Bolivia with 34%, Chile 
with 31% and Argentina with 6%.
Since the use of lithium has intensified on a commercial scale, its 
world production has increased exponentially, and has been further intensi-
fied since the 2000s, as shown in the graph below.
World Production of Lithium
Source: Lagos 2011
However, international lithium prices - which are published by major 
producers and traded directly between buyers and final users with industry 
groups and governments, with no terminal market and virtually no spot mar-
ket for third parties - is not keeping up with this high rate of world production 
growth. As the world´s production increases, lithium carbonate prices regis-
ter oscillations and a decoupling with their production.
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Evolution of lithium carbonate prices (1953-2008)
Source: Libertad y Desarrollo 2012.
The behavior of prices between 1953 and 2009 should be noted. Be-
tween these years, the price of lithium increased only by less than 20% than 
the United States CPI (Libertad y Desarrollo 2012). That is, international pric-
es show a weak growth in current dollars, and even drop when considering 
the base-year of 2008.
In the early 1990s, the average lithium carbonate prices were $4,000/t, 
decreasing to $1,600/t for several years, especially when Chile’s SQM  - So-
ciedad Química and Minera de Chile S.A.- entered the market in the mid-
1990s. From the 2000s, as demand increased, the price of lithium gradually 
increased to a peak of $6,500/t in 2008. In 2009, prices were driven by the 
global crisis, and since then, relatively stable at $5,000/t. The forecast is that, 
in the coming years, prices will be stable, at approximately $6,000/t, and 
forecasts of increase depending on the new market structure (Cormark Secu-
rities Inc. 2011).
From the graph above, five geopolitical facts can be presented as con-
clusions regarding international lithium prices: 1 – a change from a duopoly 
production of the lithium market to the mid-1990s, when SQM was intro-
duced - which explains in part marked prices fall in the second half of the 
1990s - and the Australian Talison in 2007; 2 – still in the 1990s, the large-
scale development of resources in lower-cost salt flats, such as in Chile and 
Argentina, by SQM, Germany’s Rockwood and the US FMC, modified the 
world’s lithium supply by reducing the prices, including closing down op-
erations in other parts of the world that had higher costs, such as the US, 
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Russia and China, and, in a certain extent, also explain the downward price 
curve in the mid-1990s; 3 – with the 2008 crisis, international prices decel-
erate the upward trend seen in the early 2000s with the increase in demand, 
with a slight reduction but, later on, its upward trend was resumed; 4 – from 
2010 onwards, and in the médium and long term, the world trend will be 
of a strong increase in demand influenced by Asia, whose main supply will 
be from Australia - due to its geographical proximity -, Argentina, Chile and 
from new economically viable sources. In other words, the marginal cost of 
supply will be an important factor for the basis of international lithium prices 
in the coming years; and 5 since 70% of the world’s ore reserves are in South 
America, with lower costs and higher purity, this set of three countries will 
play an important role in establishing prices.
Thus, in terms of global offer, four countries account for 92% of sup-
ply (Chile 38%, Australia 31%, Argentina 13% and China 10%) and four com-
panies concentrate 80% of this supply (Talison 35%, SQM 26%, Rockwood 
12% and FMC 7%), as shown in the image below.
Lithium supply by country (2011) and lithium supply by 
producer/company (2012)
Source: Fox-Davies 2013.
The Australian Talison Lithium is the world’s largest lithium produc-
er, supplying approximately 35% of the world’s lithium market and the dom-
inant high purity glass and ceramics industry, as well as being the main sup-
plier of lithium carbonate for the Chinese market4. In South America, it has a 
4 According to USGS data, the largest Australian mining company invested heavily in 2012 in 
order to double its capacity of production. The goal is to supply the growing Chinese demand 
for high quality spudomene for the production of chemical components. The estimated growth 
of the consumption of concentrates was estimated by 7.5% to 10% from that of 2011 and an 
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project under development in Salares 7, located in Region III, Chile (Cormark 
Securities Inc. 2011).
In 2014, the Chinese company, Chengdu Tianqi Industry Group Co. 
(Tianqi), a joint stock company leader in producing lithium-based chemicals, 
agreed to purchase Talison with the support of the Chinese government, hold-
ing 51% - the other 49% owned by Rockwood5. Since 1997, with the help 
of banks, government departments and other partners, Tianqi’s economic 
aggregate has maintained a steady growth of 40% a year6. With ambitious 
plans to meet growing demand, the company is fast becoming a leading in-
ternational company in new energy and new materials, among which lithium 
appears as one of its priorities.
In the salt regions, three companies stand out: the Chilean SQM 
(Sociedad Química y Minera de Chile SA), Germany’s Rockwood Holdings 
(which includes Chemetall from Germany since 2004, Cyprus Foote from 
the US and SCL from Chile) and the American FMC Corporation. The SQM 
owns the largest market share in salares, with 26%, from its production in 
Salar de Atacama (Chile). Rockwood comes next with a 12% stake, from plants 
in the Salar de Atacama with Sociedad Chilena del Litio Ltda – SCL and Silver 
Peak in Nevada, United States. Third, the FMC, with operations in the Salar 
del Hombre Muerto (Argentina), representing 7% of the market. Of these 
companies, FMC and Rockwood use the largest portion of their lithium pro-
duction internally for the production of value-added chemicals, leaving SQM 
the supply of the majority of lithium carbonate consumed directly by final 
users.
In January 2015, the North American Albermarle Corporation com-
pleted the acquisition of the German Rockwood Holdings7 in a cash and stock 
transaction worth approximately $6.2 billion. This combination reflects the 
creation of one of the largest specialty chemicals companies in the world, with 
market leadership positions in a number of industries segments, including 
lithium.
The key-challenges for both countries and producer companies in 
the coming years should include: expansion projects for their plants to meet 
growing demand, reduction of operational costs (such as increased output, 
intensification of the research and extraction in subsurface brines was noticed (United States 
2013).
5 http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20140528005569/en/Rockwood-Completes-Ac-
quisition-49-Interest-Talison-Lithium#.VPSw2_nF8RE
6 http://www.tianqigroup.cn/en/Index/aboutus.html
7 http://investors.albemarle.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=117031&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=2006949
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factory productivity and technological capacity), investment and development 
projects in old and new plants, updating of regulatory frameworks and juris-
diction in producing countries, updating of the market for acquisitions and 
mergers of companies, constant and quantified updating of the state of the 
global market for electric vehicles and observation of the world geopolitical 
environment related to the ore.
The lithium-producing companies boil down to the big four: in Chile 
and Argentina most of the global supply of lithium in saltwater with SQM, 
Rockwood and FMC accounts for 46% of total lithium production. Talison 
supplies 34% of total lithium production and a near monopoly (65%) of the 
production of lithium mineral (spodumene) (Cormark Securities Inc. 2011).
Regarding the global demand for lithium, total lithium consumption 
growth averaged 6.4% per year between 2000 and 2012. From 2012 to 2017, 
the annual average lithium consumption growth in the world should be ap-
proximately 11%, driven by demand for batteries, which grew on average 21% 
per year between 2000 and 2012 and is expected to grow 200% by 2017, 
reaching a market of US$9 billion in 2015, with potential to exceed US$50 
billion by 2020 (United States 2012).
The Asian technology companies continue to invest in developing lith-
ium operations in other countries to ensure a stable supply for their battery 
industries. China, Japan and South Korea are currently responsible for 85% 
to 90% of global lithium-ion battery production and 60% of world lithium 
consumption, with 24% of Europe and 9% of the United States. These three 
Asian countries, therefore, are generating a high growth of future lithium 
demand. In 2011, China became the main consumer, with 33% of the world’s 
total consumption, with forecasts of consuming almost 50% worldwide in 
2020  (United States 2012)8.
8 “Lithium battery production in China increased from units worth US$2.1B in 2007 to units 
worth US$5.4B in 2011. RIS have reported an annual demand growth forecast of 11% from 2011 
to 2017, this being dependent on the uptake of hybrid electric vehicles (“HEVs”) and electrical 
vehicles (“EVs”)” (Fox-Davies 2013).
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Lithium exports by destination country – 20129
Fonte: Cochilco 2013.
China has announced its intention to become a world leader in the 
manufacture of hybrids and electric cars, turning itself into a major player 
in the lithium market. Thus, in order to ensure strategic supply of non-re-
newable resources and to meet growing domestic consumption, the Chinese 
government established a sovereign fund, the China Investment Corporation, 
in 2007, with an initial portfolio of assets of 200 billion dollars, to support 
Chinese enterprises’ initiatives for the acquisition of unexplored deposits and 
exploration projects in any part of the world. The Chinese State has support-
ed foreign investment by Chinese enterprises through the implementation 
of regulatory frameworks for direct and indirect subsidy investments and by 
providing concessional financing in the form of credit lines and low interest 
rate loans through financial institutions owned by the State10 11 (Lagos and Pe-
ters 2010, 18). In addition, as part of its Five Year Plan (2012-17), the Chinese 
government will spend about US$ 15 billion to further promote the develop-
ment of electric vehicles by chinese companies, with much of that investment 
9 Among the main applications of basic products associated with lithium are: lithium car-
bonate (elaboration of compounds for Li-ion batteries, glass and ceramics, chemicals and adhe-
sives), lithium chloride (air conditioning and aluminum applications) and hydroxide Lithium 
(lubricating greases and Li-ion batteries).
10 “Added to the acquisition of assets abroad, with the same purpose of securing the supply of 
these resources, Chinese companies were able to extend loans to investors of mining and hy-
drocarbon industries either/or generating long term supply contracts” (Lagos and Peters 2010, 
18). This Chinese geopolitical strategy created some concerns regarding the possibility that 
China could control the flow of natural resources, gaining preferential access to production and 
enlarging its control of the extrativists industries of the world.
11 “Nowadays, the China Daily has a weekly European edition and, in May 2011, it published 
five pages, including the front one, dedicate to the issue of electrci cars. The newspaper dis-
cussed the probable future demand for cars in China, mentioning the Ministery of Industry 
and Information Technology Industry interest in reaching, until 2020, more than 200 million 
vehicles registered, well above the 70 million ones of 2011. The government announced its 
commitment to spend nearly U$ 15 billion in the next decade to boost the development of 
electric cars” (O’Neill 2012, 138).
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focused on advanced lithium battery research (Klare 2012, 169).
American automobile companies have also set hybrid and electric car 
manufacturing goals as crucial to their long-term prosperity. In 2009, of the 
government’s economic stimulus package, about US$ 940 million was attrib-
uted to lithium-battery producers and their suppliers (Klare 2012, 169). As 
part of this stimulus, Rockwood received US$ 28.4 million from the United 
States government for the expansion of its existing lithium carbonate plant in 
Nevada and to build a new lithium hydroxide plant in North Carolina12. 
In 2012, total exports of lithium compounds in the United States de-
creased slightly compared to 2011. About 52% of all US exports of lithium 
compounds went to Japan, 17% to Germany, and 7% to Belgium. Imports 
of lithium compounds into the United States decreased by 3% in 2012 com-
pared to 2011. Of these, 59% came from Chile and 38% from Argentina (Unit-
ed States 2012).
The market for small batteries (calculators, computers, cameras, com-
munication devices, etc.) is expected to maintain high levels of growth (10% 
per year), accounting for around 27% of world lithium consumption in 2012, 
a significant increase to previous years (15% in 2007 and 8% in 2002). The 
emerging market for large batteries for electric bicycles, hybrids and all elec-
tric vehicles is expected to grow substantially (up to 28% p.y.) by 2020, gaining 
greater market share. Electricity storage networks are also an emerging mar-
ket for large lithium batteries, with applications for solar and nuclear reactors 
in the near future. Lithium salts are used intensively as fluids in concentrated 
solar power plants (CSP), which has a growth estimate of 1.5GW in 2010 to 
25GW in 2020. Thus, the total demand for lithium in batteries (all types com-
bined) revolves around 65% of total consumption by 2025 (Fox-Davies 2013).
Demand for lithium batteries
Source: Fox-Davies 2013
12 http://www.carcelen.cl/upload/docs/Litio%20Amcham%20March%202011.pdf
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Several companies in the automotive industry are performing opera-
tions to supply their lithium demand for electric car batteries. The EVs cap-
ture will be the focal point of growth for the industry, where companies like 
Toyota, Nissan, Ford, GM, Tata Motors and Volkswagen are just a few. Toyota, 
for example, expects to increase its production of lithium batteries by up to 
six times, including establishing a joint venture with Orocobre in a brine pro-
ject in Argentina (Fox-Davies 2013). Likewise, the Volkswagen Group, which 
starts these operations in 2012, has established partnerships with battery 
manufacturers to start mass production of the same (United States 2012).
It is noteworthy that the international projections regarding the es-
sentiality of lithium for this new branch of technology are difficult to predict, 
besides specific characteristics of the batteries themselves, whose challenges 
need to be taken into account13. However, there have been a large number of 
government incentive programs worldwide to advance the development, pro-
duction and use of electric and hybrid cars. Despite the short-term uncertain-
ty regarding the growth of lithium batteries in the electric vehicle segment, 
it is believed that the reduction of carbon emissions by governments and 
consumers, as well as significant investments in new transport battery tech-
nology, will provide the growth of a significant future demand for lithium. 
However, there have been a large number of government incentive programs 
worldwide to advance the development, production and use of electric and 
hybrid cars. Despite the short-term uncertainty regarding the growth of lith-
ium batteries in the electric vehicle segment, it is believed that the reduction 
of carbon emissions by governments and consumers, as well as significant 
investments in new transport battery technology, will provide the growth of a 
significant future demand for lithium.
In this way, lithium possibly forms part of one of the changes in the 
world energy matrix, whose dimension is still uncertain, given that the sub-
stitution of oil as the main strategic resource is not yet evident and will persist 
in the medium term (Palacio 2012, 11). In an optimistic scenario, the electric 
car would take center stage and could, according to its supporters, break the 
dominance of oil transport, generating a positive environmental impact and 
13 “Batteries still have to be smaller, weigh less, charge faster and last longer with a single 
charge. They also need to prove that they can last longer despite continuous loads and re-
charges. They will have to show that problems of ‘thermal leakage’ - destructive overheating 
- will not happen. [...] And the cost must decrease substantially [...] Infrastructure is the second 
challenge. The current automotive system could not function without the vast network of gas 
stations built over many decades. A new fleet of electric cars will need a network of similar 
recharging stations” (Yergin 2014, 727). Among other factors, it could add to the lack of stand-
ardization in the size of EV and PHEV car batteries and the cost Relatively acceptable to be a 
mass product, not a niche product.
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helping to reduce pollution by offsetting the carbon emissions that precipitate 
climate change, since the electricity that makes the electric car work can be 
generated from several sources, and may or may not be petroleum of them. In 
addition, it could offer a response to the increase in the fleet of automobiles 
from one to two billion and represent a totally alternative route to the global 
energy system. “The result will have a huge impact both in terms of economy 
and in terms of geopolitics” (Yergin 2014, 712).
With lithium carbonate being one of the lowest cost and most rele-
vant components of a lithium-ion battery, the main issue to be addressed is 
the safety of lithium supplies from different geographic sources. Thus, the 
high demand for lithium at the beginning of the 21st century encouraged the 
prospection and exploration of 90-120 new reserves, distributed in more than 
11 countries, as shown in the figure below.
Worldwide distribution of lithium reserves (in million tonnes)
Source: United States 2014.
Although at first glance the geographical division of lithium in the 
world encompasses all continents, its concentration in absolute terms is pre-
dominantly located in South America, but specifically in the Andean region 
of the continent, the so-called “lithium triangle”.
In this region, the feeling of isolation determined by its peripheral 
location in the southwestern portion of the continent, by highly hostile top-
	
Bernardo Salgado Rodrigues, Raphael Padula
205
ographic and climatic environments (Kelly 1997, 67) and the distance from 
neighboring states and access to the sea, are geopolitical characteristics of the 
triangle. The isolation does not translate into security or the lack of interest of 
multinational companies and foreign countries, who are trying to reach their 
feet in the region. Also, according to Klare (2003,41), another worrying factor 
regarding the supply of vital materials, such as lithium, would be the fact that 
their location is shared between three countries and in neighboring regions, 
where in a small space they have different three different jurisdictions.
Yet, it is also reiterated that “the location of the so-called lithium tri-
angle is a disadvantage since the geographic concentration of lithium pro-
duction is going to exacerbate the tense geopolitical relations between Latin 
Americana and the US” (Tahil cited in Palacio 2012 , 27). In other words, 
despite the geographical difficulties, the triangle is one of the most promising 
lithium fields in the world, both because of its concentration in a relatively 
small space and because of its availability and purity that are superior in this 
region. This leads to long-term planning, as promoted by the main stakehold-
ers; of these, all four major lithium companies in the world have a portion of 
exploration in the region, as can be seen in the image below.
Triangle of Lithium in South America
	 	
Distribution of companies in the 
triangle of lithium
Source: own elaboration, from site 
map http://triangulodellitio.com/.
Source: http://www.talisonlithium.com/
sfimages/salares/salares-map.jpg.
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Thus, the region that corresponds to the salares (salt regions) of Hom-
bre Muerto, Atacama and Uyuni, the so-called triángulo del lítio, or Saudi Ara-
bia of lithium14, is considered highly strategic for the new stage of capitalist 
accumulation and for the reproduction of its mode of production. This new 
South American ABC, therefore, is part of a new competitive world pressure 
that tends to be further accentuated by the increase in the world demand for 
the resource.
In geopolitical terms, it appears that South America has generally 
been embedded in world competitive pressure where some regions, such as 
the lithium triangle itself, “must become international ‘zones of fracture’, and 
there may arise conflicts and rebellions” (Fiori 2014, 161). In addition, the ge-
opolitical study of the oro gris (gray gold) allows us to analyze the construction 
of different national strategies, public policies, institutions and regulations 
of the three countries with reservations in South America - Argentina, Boliv-
ia and Chile -, their internal and international disputes and the connections 
between internal and external actors, connecting the national, regional and 
global perspectives.
For a Geostrategy of the lithium ABC
One must understand, analyze and use geopolitics as “a strategic and 
normative knowledge that evaluates and redraws one’s own geography from 
some specific, defensive, or expansive power project” (Fiori 2014, 141). These 
power projetc should seek to leverage regional development in South Ameri-
ca anchored in a political symbiosis (progressive and autonomous), econom-
ic (productive, commercial and technological), social (reduction of regional 
asymmetries and inequalities) and geopolitical (international political and 
economic expansion).
 Thus, it is verified that the viability of a geostrategy of the lithium 
ABC is one of the pillars of a regional integration project focused on strategic 
natural resources. However, it should be noted that, in pursuit of this geo-
strategy, these states must systematically “disregard” the rules, institutions, 
and coercions of markets and all the great centers of power that are against 
their political-economic emancipation, going against the “institutional estab-
lished order and the great geopolitical agreements on which it is based” (Fiori 
2014,  276). By prioritizing joint geostrategic interests that, although unilat-
erally, are at first contradictory - as in the case of the geostrategic conception 
of Argentina directed towards the Atlantic, of Bolivia without access to the sea 
14 http://www.forbes.com/fdc/welcome_mjx.shtml
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and of Chile facing the Pacific, for example - can become a cohesive element 
of changing their relative positions within that system.
Nowdays, it can be seen that the strategies related to lithium in the 
three countries are different. In Argentina, companies and the state boost 
industrialization with private capital, which is questioned by the residents 
directly affected; in Bolivia, the strategy is based basically on the form of fi-
nancing of the state project, proposing its control by the state; and in Chile 
decisions to allow private participation in the exploitation of lithium are limit-
ed to the scope of the state - but not controlled by it - with a class between the 
government and the opposition political parties (Palacio 2012, 17).
It can be seen that in Argentina and Chile there is a predominance of 
foreign capital, a situation similar to the extraction of other strategic metals. 
These capitals, which have been investing more and more in the last 15 years 
and are positioned in specific areas, now have practically all the proven lithi-
um reserves. In addition, most of these extractive companies have direct links 
with automotive or highly lithium-demanding companies.
A different case is found in Bolivia, where a policy of corporate alli-
ances with popular organizations and other social subjects is implemented, 
in which the government situates itself in the debate in a position to the left 
of its neoliberal critics, giving legitimacy to its discourse before the nation-
al projects. However, neighboring nations do not share the thinking of eco-
nomic independence that prioritizes resource-bearing nations. They end up 
undermining Bolivia’s sustainable development opportunities in the region 
by offering large amounts of lithium to foreign miners at a much lower cost 
than Bolivian, since the basis of Argentina’s mineral exploitation model and 
in Chile it embraces the old capitalist patterns of exploitation of natural re-
sources, “in which profits accumulate in the hands of the holders of capital, 
while the exploited region is degraded, it does not develop and its workers live 
in absolute misery” (Wright 2010).
As can be seen in the specific case of Bolivia, the reaffirmation of lith-
ium for “energy sovereignty” and as a “strategic resource” - in this case also 
for Chile - manifests itself in different dimensions: control of the actual ex-
ploitation of resources, extracted volumes and possibly exported, investments 
in exploration and transport infrastructure; the sharing of profits from the 
activity; utilization of resources obtained from economic and social develop-
ment projects, as well as the quest to stimulate new productive chains based 
on an endogenous industrialization of lithium.
It is observed that the global geostrategy of lithium is in full phase of 
accumulation and concentration of capital, ratified by the acquisitions, fu-
sions and joint ventures of several companies of the branch. This fact does 
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not exclude South America from this process, where these companies have 
operations and control a large part of the region’s lithium reserves and pro-
duction, in accordance with the strategic plans of its foreign parent compa-
nies. At the same time, the conclusion that, in the near future and with full 
production, Argentina, Bolivia and Chile will manage the lithium market, it 
leads to a discussion about strategic planning based on this resource.
The regional economic development can not be understood and ex-
plained in isolation or from unique and exclusively endogenous factors. As 
Fiori (2014, 37) states, “economic development followed strategies and fol-
lowed paths that were designed in response to major systemic challenges of 
a geopolitical nature”. Aligning coalitions of interest, class or government, a 
power bloc that responds to these external challenges through strategies and 
policies of long-term economic strengthening, that calls for changes “in the 
rules of management of the world system and in its hierarchical and unequal 
distribution of power and wealth” (Fiori 2014, 35).
For Medeiros (2013, 157-158), a national strategy - and, from the pres-
ent work, concomitantly regional - is called “nationalism of natural resourc-
es”, which encompasses a political dispute involving power over resources 
and energy security of producers and consumers. Medeiros affirms that the 
control and coordination of natural resources must be carried out by the state 
in a state strategy of development and reconstruction through nationalization 
of natural resources that engenders political and fiscal autonomy for states in 
relation to private and international interests, involving complex geopolitical 
challenges. Thus, this strategy would be based on the “exploitation of indus-
trial possibilities along the value chain of natural resources” (Medeiros 2013, 
164), although with great challenges, such as the “great dependence on its un-
stable prices, its structural financial vulnerability and the constant challenges 
created by technical progress” (Medeiros 2013, 165).
Among the other challenges, we can mention the “weakness of the 
connections between capital accumulation, technical progress, structural 
change and institutional evolution” (Medeiros 2013, 150). In other words, a 
natural resource-based development can generate a particular social struc-
ture of accumulation that can block structural change from the moment that 
economic growth can be achieved without new technological structures not 
modifying the macroeconomic problems that dominate the economic policy 
agenda, the institutions and the state.
Bruckmann defends the need to think about cycles of scientific-tech-
nological innovation and economic cycles in relation to the use, transforma-
tion, appropriation and consumption of natural resources, allowing to evalu-
ate the trends of mineral consumption in the world economy. Thus, according 
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to the author, it is currently a clash between two development models based 
on strategic natural resources:
one based on the planning and sustainable use of natural resources aimed 
at meeting the needs of the majority of social actors; and the other based on 
the violent and militarized exploitation and expropriation of these resourc-
es and the social forces and peoples that hold them (Bruckmann 2011, 198).
In this way, the search, planning and protection of strategic natural 
resources becomes one of the primary security functions of the state. Some 
scholars argue that export limits seek to encourage foreign firms to set up 
their high-tech manufacturing operations requiring rare earths in Chinese 
territory (Klare 2012, 158-159), thus establishing a virtuous cycle for the coun-
try’s poorest regions, where the largest reserves are located. That is to say, if 
such control over resources and export restraint were adopted as a joint policy 
of the three countries, the positive consequences might resemble those of the 
Chinese initiative.
As Kelly (1997, 159) points out, “major domestic groups have come to 
recognize that without South American integration, local economies could be 
exposed to a global ‘marginalization’”. In other words, cooperative and unify-
ing orientation in the form of integration, the realization of autonomous and 
sovereign regional blocs are presented as a practical way for the new reality of 
the region in international relations. In fact, internal cooperation, rather than 
conflict, emerges prominently in contemporary South American geopolitics.
Conclusion
In the present work geopolitics was the method used for studying the 
international political economy of the South America countries, focusing on 
strategic natural resources, specifically lithium.
It is well known that even if we go to South American peripheral ge-
opolitical studies, the world’s great centers of power also make systematic 
prognoses about geopolitics in South America and the world, and undoubt-
edly geopolitical shocks are present in the international arena. The accumula-
tion of power and wealth lies at the heart of the matter, and so understanding 
the geopolitical configurations of the region is fundamental.
In sum, the set of five proposals outlined below covers guidelines for 
a geopolitics of strategic natural resources in the region. Thus, in the specific 
case of lithium, these initiatives should be discussed jointly by the three coun-
tries, thus conforming a regional geopolitics of lithium:
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• Regional security planning and resource protection: strategic securi-
ty of natural resources should be part of a regional project, with state technical 
agencies, particularly the armed forces, obliged to defend these new natural 
sources in native soil. This will be all the more important when the lack of en-
ergy, water, raw materials and food on the world stage worsens. From this hy-
pothetical international scenario, a vital objective is the intensification of the 
South American armed forces, within the framework of the South American 
Defense Council of Unasur, in order to have a dissuasive-strategic capacity;
• Endogenous industrialization policy: the geopolitics of lithium in 
the region provokes the need to elaborate a regional lithium industrialization 
policy that moves the production of rechargeable batteries of portable elec-
tronic devices and electric cars from Southeast Asia to South America. This 
policy should be planned continentally, determining which productive sec-
tors of the South American system could gain international competitiveness, 
transforming them into sectors of collective interest of all the countries that 
conform the area of integration, appropriating scientific and technological re-
search in relation to the mineral and developing its entire cycle, from mining 
to local industrial development, achieving an industry with high added value;
• Participation in the establishment of international prices: once the 
region has a large concentration of the world’s reserves of strategic resources, 
it has ample capacity for negotiation and international price formation. Since 
Argentina, Bolivia and Chile control almost all lithium reserves, the three na-
tions could set up an organization similar to that of oil-producing countries, 
with the capacity to take measures that in the future, will influence the regu-
lation of metal prices;
•  Effective national public governance of natural resources: such pre-
rogative involves regulatory, fiscal, macroeconomic management, strategic 
planning, formulation and implementation of public policies. Thus, coun-
tercyclical mechanisms should be institutionalized in the face of the inher-
ent volatility of the international prices of primary products exported by the 
region, increasing the progressiveness of the state’s participation in farm in-
come - especially in the cycles of high prices - in order to develop mechanisms 
to ensure efficient public investment of income derived from the exploitation 
of natural resources in education, health, infrastructure, innovation and tech-
nological development, as well as their equitable distribution among social 
groups and levels of government;
• Measuring environmental and social impact: to manage and ef-
fectively measure the socio-environmental conflicts that inevitably arise dur-
ing the development of the natural resource sectors, calculating compensation 
rates, environmental recovery strategies and reducing negative externalities.
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Managing natural resources is a dynamic process and requires careful 
monitoring. Information and knowledge are fundamental sources of policy 
and decision making, so it is imperative to create tools to move in that direc-
tion. The continuing and systematic research is needed to deepen the study 
and knowledge of the various dimensions that involve the use of natural re-
sources as a basis for the integral development of the region.
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ABSTRACT
This article investigates the hypothesis that lithium is one of the most strategic natu-
ral resources, whose world reserves, quantitatively and qualitatively, are concentrated 
in the South American region. Thus, this article presents a geopolitical analysis of 
lithium in order to define geostrategic possibilities for South America.
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